Trois essais sur l'indépendance des banques centrales // Three essays on central bank independance
- Pessac, Gironde
- CDD
- Temps-plein
However, numerous recent works indicate a growing politicization of central banks since the 2007/2008 crisis (Alesina and Stella, 2010; Fernández-Albertos, 2015; Lockwood, 2016; Binder and Spindel, 2017; de Haan et al., 2018). This politicization implies, on the one hand, that central banks have an increasingly central role in national political life. On the other hand, this importance of the central bank has been reinforced by the European sovereign debt crisis (Afonso et al., 2018) and the COVID-19 pandemic (Feldkircher et al., 2021; Wei and Han, 2021). In addition to drastically increasing the weight of monetary authority, this politicization can also alter the nature of interactions between fiscal and monetary policy (Azad et al., 2021) as well as the frequency of these interactions (Balls et al., 2018).
Recent crises have impacted the execution of monetary policy by diminishing the central bank's margins of maneuver. An increasing number of countries have experienced, in recent years, a shift from a situation of monetary dominance to one of fiscal dominance (de Haan and Eijffinger, 2019). Moreover, concerns regarding the potential return of central banks monetizing public deficits have resurfaced, particularly following the increase in public spending induced by the COVID-19 epidemic (Lawson and Feldberg, 2020). Central banks find themselves under political pressures as well as electoral pressures, despite a consistently higher level of de jure independence. According to Binder (2021a), over a span of 9 years (2010-2019), the number of countries where central banks face pressures has tripled.
The implementation of monetary policy is also impacted by the emergence of numerous political parties labeled as populist (Mudde, 2012). These parties, characterized by anti-elite rhetoric, place the responsibility for economic crises on central banks (Rodrik, 2018). This mechanism is particularly highlighted by Bodea et al. (2019), who demonstrate that an independent central bank reduces the chances of survival for an autocratic government.
Finally, the normalization of monetary policy poses a risk to banks and a risk of financial crisis, which central banks can internalize.
The objective of this thesis will be to study the forms and evolution of central bank independence. It will examine the pressures that central banks may face (political, economic, and financial) that can alter their behavior. The impact of fiscal dominance will be one of the points to highlight, as well as the impact of the risk of bank failure. The link between the rise of populist parties and forms of central bank independence may also be studied.Début de la thèse : 01/10/2024Funding category: Contrat doctoral
Concours pour un contrat doctoral MESRI
PHD Country: FranceRequirementsSpecific RequirementsDiplôme de master recherche obtenu en France ou en Europe. Très bon dossier académique. Le mémoire de recherche doit montrer les capacités du candidat à effectuer un travail doctoral. Autres diplômes ou diplômes obtenus dans d'autres pays, demande de dérogation nécessaire.
Master's degree obtained in France or Europe. Excellent academic record. The research thesis must demonstrate the candidate's ability to conduct doctoral-level work. For other degrees obtained in different countries, a request for an exemption is necessary.Additional InformationWork Location(s)Number of offers available 1 Company/Institute Université de Bordeaux Country France City Pessac GeofieldWhere to apply WebsiteSTATUS: EXPIRED
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